MEMOIR

ON THE DEFENCE

OF THE

GULF OF MEXICO

AND THE

STRAGETIC PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE

NATIONAL DEFENCES.

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MEMOIR.

Twenty-eight years of peace amongst the civilized nations have achieved a mighty, though silent change in the relations of those nations to each other. A change the philanthropist rejoices at, and feels that each year brings with it assurance of increased exertions, means and hopes of the preservation of peace through all time.

Fortunately for peace, the great powers, England, France and the United States are striving for commerce at home and abroad, and have, in respect to the latter, dependence on each other for profitable exchange of the produce of the soil and machinery of their respective countries. The interests of these nations lie in the peaceful prosecution of commercial pursuits, without interruption either from a vicious policy of one or more of their number, or by the weaker powers; hence a guarantee is afforded that no nation acting from unwise councils and hasty determination will be permitted, in a resort to war, to compromise those interests. Negociation must continue in place of brute force demonstration; equity and justice in that of bomb shells and "Peace Makers." And when a nation foolishly prefers the latter, to redress real or supposed wrong, it must be held in restraint until arbitration and just decision make safe its honor and its interests, and the world's quiet.

But though peace appears resting on a firm foundation, yet it must not be denied as a part of wisdom, that much as moral power has to do with its ascendency, the physical must neither be disregarded nor indifferently attended to.

England, France and other nations of Europe have not since 1816, and in profound peace, intermitted their exertions for supremacy of defence. Large additions have been made to their navies, and to their strong places inland and on their coasts.

The navies of England and France were never stronger or better organized than in 1845. Steam has given an immense advantage not only in the conflicts of ships and squadrons, but as means of transporting considerable armies.

Steam has equalized the chances of future contests between England and France: if other evidence were wanting of this, we could refer to the

proposition made in the English Parliament, and strongly advocated, to fortify existing harbors and to create new ones for depots and refuge for their war vessels as well also to guard them against the sudden attack of French steamers.

England in her mighty naval contests, depended almost exclusively for the defence of her co sts upon her ships. London, Hull, Bristol, Liverpool, Dublin, Cork, &c., were open harbors, yet perfect security was felt in the power of the "wooden walls." Still, as history informs us, in despite of that power, she was at the point of an invasion, which the *chance* battle of Trafalgar alone prevented, for if the celebrated and most ably conceived naval stratagem of Napoleon, combined with the army assembled at Boulogne, had succeeded, the French would have been masters of the English channel, and an army of 100,000 precipitated on the shores of England. Nothing but the blunder of the admiral Villeneuve prevented the success of this splendid demonstration, which in the thinking of many was the military chief d'œuvre of the greatest man of the age. England closed the successive contests proudly boasting that in their course no hostile foot ever pressed her soil. But that security no longer exists, and the equalizing power of steamery will compel England to fortify her coasts as strongly as that of France or the United States.

Removed as the United States are from European relations both in distance and policy, they have not deemed it necessary to maintain the same extent of preparation. They have wisely determined not to add largely to the navy—building ships in time of peace, but they deem it the more important that the imperishable material for a large fleet should be constantly accumulating; and that the facilities in the way of docks and other naval fixtures be created, so that on a sudden emergency a large fleet may be brought into activity in a short time. Hand in hand with such preparation the defence of the naval depots, the large cities and strong sailent points have progressed, and there is much cause for rejoicing at its advanced condition. Still much remains to be done and the public sentiment of the country is clearly in favor of its accomplishment. Congress seems to have understood and responded to this sentiment. Its last session was distinguished for important acts; authorizing new works, which directed a Navy Yard for the construction of steamers to be established at Memphis; increased appropriations for the naval arsenal at Pensacola, and the occupation of Tortugas and Key West and other available points on the Florida Reef; at once grasping all the points so necessary to the defence of the Mexican sea and its vast tributary regions.

The military defence of the Gulf coast within our limits, commenced when Mr. Calhoun was Secretary of War, and urged forward by that distinguished statesman has not been disregarded by the government, especially since the present able Chief Engineer has been its military adviser. The approaches to New Orleans and Mobile have been occupied by strong works. The naval position at Pensacola is already surrounded with fortifications, the completion of which rests with a small Redoubt, in the progress of construction.

The remainder of the works at Pensacola and those designed for Memphis are in the hands of the Navy. The defence of the Florida Reef and

one or two points within the Gulf of Mexico, necessary as depots for coal, remain to be completed by the Engineer Department.

In reference to the Florida Reef, the subject of defence has been treated by military men of great ability. No doubt exists in the minds of all as to the importance and pressing necessity of occupying the prominent points of the Reef, Key West and the Tortugas, speedily, and with such measure of defence as to render them difficult of siege or the slower process of blockade.

Bahia Honda, another point of the Reef, may be deemed worthy of occupation, as affording the only close harbor within the Reef from Key West to Cape Florida, in which our vessels could find safe anchorage and refuge. The open roadstead at Knight's Key, at the west end of Key Vachos, affords a good anchorage and is sheltered from north winds, but is openly exposed to other winds. In northerly winds shelter is found under the Keys along the whole Reef, so that Knight's Key affords no advantage on this score. Its defence, or rather that of its dependent anchorage, would be difficult, and it is thought when it is further considered, it will be deemed unworthy of occupation.

Boca Grande is a wide channel lying west of Key West and connects the Reef channel with the Gulf of Mexico. Vessels may pass through this channel drawing no more than 14 feet water. It cannot be defended, lacking any possible site for a battery, nor is it necessary in respect of a harbor, for it affords no better one than can be found at any point within the Reef. A site would be desirable for occupancy to prevent a communication on a shorter line, between the divisions of any enemy's fleet blockading the north and south channels of the harbor of Key West. So to do would afford a great advantage, seeing that exclusion from the Boca Grande channel would force the enemy to double the quicksands within 20 miles of the Tortugas.—But it cannot be done.

Considering that war steamers would enter largely if not exclusively in our naval forces in the Gulf of Mexico, it is important that convenient depots for coal should be established. Deposits of coal should be made at Bahia Honda and at Key West. At Tortugas a three years supply for thirty steamers should be constantly maintained. A position for a coal depot at some point on the western coast of Florida is certainly necessary. Tampa Bay would probably afford the requisite depth of water for heavy steamers, and convenient sites for the depot and its defenee. Thus held it would also give protection to vessels seeking refuge from an enemy. A coal depot should be established at Pensacola, and at Mobile Point under the protection of fort Morgan. Another depot for coal would afford great facilities to steam operations if established at Ship Island. A strong battery, but not costly, would protect the harbor. This depot would be easier of access than the one at fort Jackson on the Mississippi and would afford supplies not only to the light steamers cruizing along the coast, but to those of the heaviest class. A depot at fort Jackson would be necessary to enable the steamers descending from Memphis to take in a full supply of coals before proceeding to sea.

It is in place here to exhibit a statement, near the truth, of the cost of the public works, military and naval, already completed within the Gulf of Mexico and those necessary to be executed:

At Fort Livinsgton, (may be completed in one year) -	$300,000
" Jackson, (in course of repairs) - - -	700,000
" St. Phillips, do. - - - -	51,000
" Bienvenue, - - - - - -	120,000
" Dupre, - - - - - -	25,000
" Pike, - - - - - - -	400,000
" Wood, - - - - - -	410,000
" Morgan, (in course of repairs) - - -	1,100,000
" Pickens, - - - - - -	740,000
" McRae, - - - - -	335,000
" Barrancas, - - - -	334,000
Advanced Redoubt of do. (course of construction)	150,000
Amount for fortifications, "	$4,564,000
Probable amount expended at Navy Yard, Pensacola,	$600,000
Sundry additions and improvements, exclusive of Docks,	1,000,000
For three Dry Docks, - - - -	2,100,000
Total for Pensacola, - -	$3,700,000
A Dry Dock at Key West is indispensable, - - -	500,000
Store houses in connection therewith, - - - -	200,000
Two floating docks of some description must be arranged for Tortugas, say of iron, - - - -	300,000
Store houses in addition to what may be afforded by the works,	500,000
Establishment at Memphis, - - - -	1,000,000
Total of naval fixtures indispensable and necessary to be accomplished as soon as possible, - - -	$5,600,000
To which add in time of war 30 steamers of war of 2500 tons burden, built at St. Louis, Cincinnati, Memphis, New Orleans and Pensacola, roughly but of great strength and speed, completely armed and equipped at $400,000 each, - - - - - - - -	12,000,000
Grand total of naval means,	$18,200,000
The defence of Key West will cost - - - -	1,500,000
That of Tortugas, - - - - - - - -	1,500,000
That of Bahia Honda (probably) - - - - - -	200,000
That of Tampa Bay do - - - - - -	200,000
That of Ship Island do - - - - - -	100,000
Grand total of military means necessary to be applied,	$3,500,000
Total do already applied, - -	4,564,000
Grand total of naval means, of which $12,000,000 is for a moveable force and belongs as much to the Atlantic coast as to the Gulf, - - - - -	17,600,000
Total of naval means already applied, - - - -	600,000

Grand total for Gulf defence, part of which can be applied directly to the protection of the Atlantic coast whilst the whole acts indirectly in accomplishing the object, - - - - - - - - - $26,264,000

This large sum (though not too large for the interests to be protected,) would be applied to more than one-half the surface and population of the United States, if considered geographically and dependently of the country west of the Alleghany mountains. But its consideration involves every section of the country, and none more so than the extreme sections of the north-east—Maine having as direct interest in the defence of the Gulf of Mexico as if it were applied to her own coasts: her ships and carrying trade requiring it as much as the safe transit of the vast productions of the west. So that, whilst the consideration of defensive points of the north and south Atlantic coasts has for the most part a local tendency, that of the Gulf of Mexico embraces the interests of the country at large. A quotation from a letter of a distinguished gentleman, formerly at the head of the War Department, is apposite to the subject, "and it must be borne in mind that the evils which would result from the temporary occupation of the delta of the Mississippi, or from a successful blockade of the coasts of the Gulf of Mexico, would not only injure the prosperity of these States, but would deeply affect the interests of the whole Union; no reasonable expense therefore ought to be spared to guard against such a casualty."

From the above statement it is seen that the sum of $4,564,000 has been (or nearly so,) applied to a strong defensive cordon, extending from Barrataria to Pensacola, embracing every important point on the re-entering coast of the Gulf of Mexico. That $600,000 have been applied to the Naval Depot at Pensacola, and that $9,100,000 of permanent naval and military fixtures remain to be established, of which the military fixtures of fortifications require the sum of $3,500,000, the commencement and completion of which is urgently demanded in the least possible time, and as it can be effected at a most "reasonable expense," and as Congress has sanctioned the policy, it is hoped that it will not withhold the means for its speedy consummation, especially as it looks to the occupation of the grand salient and stratgetic point of North America, which may be made as strong as the impregnable rock of Gibraltar.

The completion of the defences at Key West and Tortugas should be effected in the shortest time that may be consistent with safe construction. The policy of occupation should be followed up by rapid operations.—These great salient and stratgetic points had better not be occupied at all, than that the completion of their defences should be protracted to some twenty years. Perhaps in three or four years the contest may be begun and ended by which Cuba must pass from the dominion of Spain to that of some other power—that power must be the United States under any circumstances. Is it not the part of wisdom to propitiate those circumstances as much as possible, by preparations that will render them easier of combination, and more favorable to the saving of blood and treasure?

It is to be regretted that the advice given years ago, in respect to the occupation of Key West and Tortugas, had not been followed; but the selfishness of the people of the North, the indifference of the West, and the conse-

quent helplessness of the South, have prevented the importance of these points being duly appreciated. The commercial interests of the North, and the agricultural interests of the West, are identical with the local interests of the South in these national works, and it is hoped that Congress will not hesitate to make such appropriations as will ensure the completion of the defences at Key West and Tortugas in *three years*. Then our right flank will be secure and we shall possess in the Tortugas alone, a strategic point worth a hundred Gibaraltars.

If the United States do not occupy Key West and Tortugas, an enemy may. (The enemy is always supposed English as the present dominant naval power.) In many respects those positions would be more valuable to him than the Havana, because of the facility of defence; and in the case ot Tortugas, impracticability of siege.—The enemy would very soon with the materials of the islands, (of which also he could make lime) construct such works as would protect his naval forces and operations during war and perhaps, making them impregnable like Gibaraltar, refuse at its conclusion to re-deliver. At all events, he would be able to dictate the terms of peace from the fortress of Tortugas.

If the United States occupy those positions, they must be observed by the enemy, and if, as it should, a naval force of heavy steamers be stationed at the Tortugas, it must be blockaded by a naval force of the same description, three and a half times as large, occupying the S. E., S. W. and north channels, and then how difficult such a blockade? maintained in the open sea midst currents, shoals, and storms and the attacks of the blockaded force. Suppose ten steamers blockaded, then three divisions of the enemy's steamers of at least 11 in each, with two for communication, making in all *thirty-six* would be required. *Cui bono!* Certainly none to the enemy, but much to the blockaded, for with ten steamers they place 36 hors d'activite! Besides coal must be supplied from the enemy's depots at Nassau, Jamaica, &c., the convoying of which would require four or five vessels. The blockade of Key West, even if it did not constrain a naval force, would probably be maintained to prevent supply and repel attack from our steamers coming from the Mississippi and Pensacola. The divisions of their blockading force could not be less than five vessels each, stationed at the north and south channels. They must also be steamers, for they are liable to be attacked by steamers. To guard against the contingency of a starving blockade, one year's supply of provisions and of munitions must be kept constantly on hand in time of war. To facilitate the operations of our steamers, which in good time would be sent forth in sufficient force—three year's supply of coal must be maintained.—But in making such preparation we suppose a constant blockade uninterrupted by natural causes, or the succor of a naval force. It is safest to do so. But it is believed that though Key West can be blockaded at its north and south channels against the entrance of large vessels, yet light vessels, boats and canoes can hold constant communication with the coast of Florida, from which supplies of provisions could be drawn. One article of which alone, the flour of the *Cumti root* seems to be providentially supplied for the sustenance of man when all else failed. The Tortugas, more distant and insulated, are more difficult of blockade, and perhaps

impracticable in preventing supplies in light vessels passing over the shoals which surround them. How stands the blockade account? And if it be raised—how long would the enemy remain in the Gulf if he sailed into it, threatening Mobile and New Orleans?.

The blockaded are defended by strong works, with ample supplies of coals, provisions, and munitions; likely to be reinforced from the Mississippi; often attacking and injuring the enemy; safe from the casualties common to the enemy; with a fair prospect of the enemy's giving up the profitless contest; when if the enemy turned into the Gulf, threatening New Orleans and Mobile, the blockaded forces would follow and effect a junction with the forces at Pensacola and thence with those issuing from the Mississippi, descended from Memphis.

Per contra: The blockaders persisting in the blockade, waste time and money and oppose a force of 46 steamers, and convoy vessels to 10 of ours blockaded. They give up the blockade and possibly sail into the Gulf, *increasing their distance from their coal depots*, to encounter the resistance of well fortified points, and the attack of reinforcements of steamers from Pensacola and Memphis, added to those released from Tortugas.—Here the chance of success is hopeless, at least as one to twenty. With certain annoyance, and chances daily multiplied against them of complete discomfiture, they sail from the Gulf. The assailed become the assailants; our naval force assembles at Tortugas and Key West. It observes the Carribean sea, the Bahama channels and the Florida stream. It overlooks Nassau, Jamaica, and the windward islands of the enemy. Those possessions lie at our mercy unless the enemy guards them; we hold his naval forces in check there. It is not our policy to attack them. We are ready in the mean time to move our naval forces down the Florida stream along the Atlantic coast in strength sufficient to relieve all probable blockades; to afford convoy to vessels going in and out of the Gulf and to form junctions with the naval forces of the North, by which they become strong enough to drive the enemy into surrender or to their ports of Halifax and Bermuda. So that, the strategy due to the Mexican sea has direct effect on that of the north and south Atlantic. May not the grand salient of the Gulf indeed be considered the stratgetic point of the country?.

1st. During operations and observations in the Gulf of Mexico and at its grand salient, a considerable portion of the enemy's fleet is detached from his home shores; from the Atlantic; from the protection of his commerce and colonies all over the world, and as we have seen without the chance of striking a blow.

2d. With reinforced steam squadrons and skilful demonstrations at Tortugas and Key West, he is compelled to put himself on the defensive at Nassau, Jamaica, etc.

3d. By prompt movements with vast steamers passing from Tortugas rapidly along the Atlantic coast, blockades would be raised, our naval forces in Norfolk, New York, etc. reinforced and a strength obtained that would enable us to pursue and drive into harbor; or, perhaps, happily to capture the enemy's forces.

The proposition is a simple one, though with poor ability not well elabo-

rated; but with clear thinking it will be understood; and with no extraordinary means it can be achieved. Then will it be clearly shown that the policy of our defence is that of attack. At this stage, at all events, the country would rest in security; but why not go farther? Why not threaten England with blockake and invasion as well as to receive threats and action from her? Our means are ample and our resources and power adequate. Let us see how they could be applied.

Suppose 25 ships of the line were assembled at Norfolk, the Atlantic sailent, *and their declared destination the coast of England*, then must 25 ships of the line be kept at Portsmouth or some port in the English channel, and at least 20 ships of the line held in readiness to sail round and watch the English coast. Liverpool, London, Hull, Bristol, Dublin, Cork, etc. are open harbors.

Suppose also 40 double bank frigates of 60 guns, 32 pounders, to sail in squadron as it was done in the war of 1812, in miniature, with so much effect against the enemy's commerce, and to attack his colonies all over the world—in this crusade our light cruisers and private armed ships would bear no small or profitless part. Let those squadrons be commanded by men possessing the naval skill, the indomitable energy of a Porter and a Decatur, and we should see England obliged to send three ships for every one of ours thus sent forth; but so large a force could not so easily be despatched by England—in the mean time she would suffer devastation to her commerce and the almost annihilation to her colonial trade, which is the marrow to her bones, and without which she would wither and die.

Thus then would England be compelled to hold her naval forces for the protection of her own home shores; for her vast commerce and her colonies wide spread over the world, leaving not a single vessel to flutter her boasted cross within sight of the shores that once owned her sway.

It is not supposed that this state of things would at once be arrived at, but its approach in a just and popular war would be rapid and inevitable, and England viewing it as destructive to her power, would seek an honorable peace, which would be granted—for our policy is not conquest or domination by brute force, but to disseminate our blessed institutions by peaceful means.

The fortification of the naval depots, of the large cities, of important roadsteads and strong salient points, in combination with the moving force of the navy by steam and sails, constitute emphatically the right arm of our defence. A defence that must be eminently successful, for it exhibits the base and radiating lines for offensive operations. But it may be objected that so large a moving force could not be created, lacking men, that its cost would be too great; that Congress would not adopt it. We must show that men may be had; that the cost will be less than any other defence; and that our security will be greater. Let our people understand that it is quite as cheap and quite as easy to carry the war into Africa as to await the attack without attacking, and they will receive the suggestion and with wise councils adopt it.

First, for the cost of the naval force alluded to in this memoir.

ESTIMATE:

30 steamers of 2500 tons, built in the west, at $400,000 each,	$12,000,000
20 steamers do " in the Atlantic ports, do. in addition to the probable number already built,	8,000,000
40 frigates of 60 guns, 32 pounders, at $300,000 each,	12,000,000
14 ships of the line at $400,000 each, - -	5,600,000
Repairing and refitting 11 ships already built, - -	1,500,000
Sundry corvettes, light steamers, etc. - -	3,900,000
Grand total of moving force,	$43,000,000

Annual cost at war rates:

25 ships of the line at $200,000 each, - -	$5,000,000
40 frigates at $150,000 each, - -	6,000,000
20 steamers on the Atlantic, supposing they used steam 200 days in the year, at $150,000, - -	3,000,000
30 steamers in the Gulf of Mexico, do. do.	4,500,000
Sundry light vessels, corvettes, brigs, steamers, etc., -	1,500,000
Wear and tear, repairs, casualities, etc., say 120 vessels at $15,000 - - - - -	1,500,000
Ordnance, powder, recruiting, dock yards, marine corps, etc.,	5,000,000
Grand total of annual cost,	$25,000,000

All military men agree that in a war with England, Canada would fall an easy conquest to our arms. England would not attempt to keep it.—Our army would be required to occupy the fortifications and the Indian frontier. The local volunteer force would assist in the former service, affording to it two-thirds the required force; but as it is seen our coasts would be secure from attack, this local force of volunteers need not be in activity more than half the year; located near the batteries, a signal cannon would bring them within the hour to their posts. So that, supposing 60,000 men necessary for the Indian frontier and fortification defence, they being under pay one half of the year;

We estimate for its cost: - - -	$15,000,000
And also for repairs for works, new ordnance, etc. -	5,000,000
Grand total of annual cost of defence,	$45,000,000

Now it is supposed that $10,000,000 would be given to the navy at least, in a war with England, admitting the stratgetic operations in this memoir, not adopted. In this case our coast would be left more liable to attack, and increased vigilance at our forts would be required, in short, at least 60,000 men would be kept on pay the whole year, thereby increasing the cost estimated above in the sum of $15,000,000, which is the exact difference between $25,000,000 that would move our naval force to attack and $10,000,000 that would afford it only limited action. In the one case the war is carried from our shores and perfect security is felt, and our coasting and home trade remain uninterrupted. In the other case, without diminution of expense, the land force being increased in pay, our cities would be subject to blockade; our coasting trade harrassed, and the inhabitants kept in constant alarm.

In the two cases, admitting the expense to be equal, the extended naval armament would be the cheapest, for the coasting trade and that of neutrals to our ports, free of blockade, would pour large revenues into the Treasury.

The lack of men to man our fleet would seem the greatest difficulty, the force required being sixty thousand, of which twelve thousand five hundred being marines and marine artillerymen, forty-seven thousand five hundred would remain of sailors, ordinary sailors, landsmen and boys : of this number say twelve thousand prime sailors ; twelve thousand ordinary do. ; twelve thousand landsmen and eleven thousand boys. Our commercial marine employs one hundred and fifteen thousand sailors ; there are engaged on the lakes and rivers forty thousand men acsustomed to the navigation of steamers, canal boats, keel and flat boats. From this number, as our ocean commerce would be curtailed, we could certainly draw twenty-four thousand sailors and ordinary sailors, and the remaining landsmen and boys could readily be obtained amongst the river boatmen and general population. Bounties of land could be offered, which added to the prize money, would undoubtedly supply our fleet with the men required, from amongst our own people. But a naval war would be attractive to the sailors of all nations, who would probably prefer our service to that of England. At all events it would be quite as easy for the United States to man her fleets as it would be for England to man hers.

The naval force of the United States.	The naval force of England.
25 ships of the line.	45 ships of the line.
40 60 gun frigates.	80 frigates of 60 guns.
50 steamers.	70 steamers.
30 vessels of other classes.	90 vessels of other classes.
145 with 60,000 men.	285 with 110,000 men.

The subject of the defence of the Gulf of Mexico is intimately connected with that of the whole coast of the United States. And in discussing the principles governing the stragetic operations of the latter, we have been able to place in bolder relief the importance of the former, to which we again turn in order to consider it with regard to the localities, plans, armament and garrisons of works, and the nature of defence, proposed for Key West, Tortugas and the Florida Reef.

In relation to the system of works proposed; their reciprocal action and individual capacity; there remains but little discussion for the Engineer. At Tortugas, nature has performed more than half the work by establishing firm coral foundations almost in the exact positions that the art of the Engineer would have selected. Suitable works erected at these positions will render that portion of the Tortugas harbors, impregnable to assault, and nearly impracticable of blockade. Those positions are so clearly indicated, as to leave no doubt in the examiner's mind, as to their being the true ones. Briefly stating the names of positions and the objects and capacities of the intended works is sufficient to the understanding of the whole subject. * * * * * *

It is in place here to refer to the able letter of Commodore Rodgers to the Secretary of the Navy, July 3, 1829. (Senate documents, 1st session,

21st Congress, vol. 1, page 236) and to a letter from the Secretary of the Navy, March 25, 1830, Senate document, 1st session, 21st Congress, vol. 2, No. 111, page 1, relative to the harbor of Tortugas. Other distinguished naval officers at sundry times have given opinions in favor of the importance of Key West and Tortugas, as the great stratgetic point of the Gulf of Mexico. These points received the attention of the War Department as early as 1822. Lieut. Tuttle, of the Engineers, surveyed Key West in that year and made a very interesting report on the geological and topographical features of the island and neighboring reef and keys and their capacity for defence. Colonel Totten, the chief Engineer of the United States, has repeatedly announced to the government the necessity of occupying positions on the Florida Reef at the proper time. In one of his reports he says: "The influence of these advanced military positions, combined with naval means, upon the general commerce of the Gulf, and upon great naval and military combinations in that quarter, *whether offensive or defensive*, is no new idea with those whose duties have connected them with such questions." In another he says, "and it would afford a point of refuge to our navy and commerce, at the very spot where it would be most necessary and useful." Captain Sanders, of the Engineers, says, "Art should be exhausted in fortifying either Tortugas or Key West." Another writer on the subject says, "The efficient defence of the Gulf of Mexico must depend upon steam vessels of war. They can be quickly built, armed and fitted in the western country and at Pensacola. Thirty could be ready in six months, equal in all respects to the Missouri and Mississippi"—and again, "we ought not only to clear the Gulf of any hostile fleet, but carry on offensive operations against the depots at Nassau, Jamaica, etc." Gen. Jessup, Quarter Master General of the United States, says "Key West, the Dry Tortugas and Key Biscayne are the great stratgetic points on our southern frontier. They should be strongly fortified." Capt. Bernard, U. S. E., in an excellent report to the government, speaks of "the unrivalled qualities of the Tortugas as a harbor almost impracticable of blockade." Gen. Gaines has given much of his valuable time to the subject of the defence of the Gulf of Mexico and its effect upon the interests of the country. In short, the subject has received constant attention since Mr. Calhoun, at the head of the War Department, took the initiative in its developement. His attention was directed to the Tortugas and Key West as early as 1822, and happily we have arrived at the time when these important points are to be occupied, as well also when the Pensacola Navy Yard shall be placed on the footing its importance deserves and the Gulf defence made perfect. A defence, as it has been before observed, in which every section of our country is deeply interested.

It has been attempted in the course of this brief memoir to show:

1st. That the chances for peace amongst the civilized nations are many; every year of its continuance giving assurance of its permanence.

2d. That notwithstanding these blessed assurances, following the example of other nations, we must not intermit exertions for the preparation for the contingency of war.

3d. That much has already been done for the defence of the country whilst much remains to be done.

4th. That the right arm of that defence are the Navy and Fortifications.

5th. That a proper combination of both will enable us to force the enemy, however apparently strong in naval means, to look to his own shores and to his colonies leaving him no time nor means to repeat the scenes (so unworthy a great nation) of Hampton and Havre de Grace.

6th. And what is due to the occupation of Tortugas, Key West and the Florida Reef and the cousequences flowing therefrom.

WM. H. CHASE.

Chasefield, near Pensacola, March 10th, 1845.

SOME ADDITIONAL MEMORANDA EXHIBITING THE STRATGETIC PRINCIPLES THAT SHOULD GOVERN THE GENERAL DEFENCE; AND THE MEANS BY WHICH THOSE PRINCIPLES MAY BE APPLIED.

The means are derived from:

1st: 20,000,000 of people determined to maintain their rights and the integrity of their country against foes without and traitors within, and who have a glorious history to refer to, showing what they have already achieved on these scores.

2d. From vast military and naval resources, from which a large army and a powerful navy may be created and brought into activity in six months.

Thanks to a wise policy of the Government, our arsenals are filled with the machinery of war; our great cities and naval depots are strongly fortified; and our militia, especially the voluntary divisions of the same, armed and equipped.

It is true, during twenty.eight years of peace, a large military establishment has not be maintained; and every American should thank God that it could not be maintained, even if unwise councils had directed its maintenance.

The citizens of our blessed country prefer labor and freedom in time of peace, to the comparative ease of the soldier confined to fort or camp. But in war our army will not lack men. They will come down from the mountains and up from the valleys, ready to do battle for their country at home and abroad. These will be commanded by men educated at the military academy, who in the time of peace preferring the plough to the sword, have entered civil life soon after they completed their military studies at the national school. These men it is perceived, would be at once selected for high offices in the army, and well qualified will they be both by education and patriotism to fulfil their trusts.

60,000 regular soldiers are estimated by mititary men to be sufficient to garrison our fortifications and afford an army for the protection of our Indian frontier and the invasion of Canada. Of this number the fortifications of the sea coast require 30,000 men, one half of which might be supplied from the local volunteer forces of the country, leaving a force disposable, of 45,000 regulars for the Indian frontiers and the Canada demonstration. Our Canadian frontier country from Wisconsin to New Hampsbire is teeming with population. At the call of the Government 200,000

armed men spring forth from this population and respond, waiting eagerly the signal to precipitate themselves into Canada. Whilst hundreds of steamers and sailing vessels are ready to transport them over the lakes where *cœlum non animum mutant.*

What though a war with England cost $100,000,000 per annum, shall we hesitate to wage war if it be just? let it *be just;* let the people be called upon to defend their rights; to repel insult; and to uphold their free institutions and those that are happily making their way throughout the world; then will the people cheerfully bear the burden, even if a war so holy, should cost twice $100,000,000.—For in its course, under an energetic government the last vestige of European domination would be swept, as it ought, from the continent of North America.

The capitalists of our country as well as those of Europe, would press their loans of money upon our Government.—There would be no lack of the sinews of war. And here let it be noted, that the far-seeing capitalist of Europe would prefer to invest his money in the stock of the United States Government, looking to the probability that a war between England and the United States would involve Europe in the contest. The capitalist sees that the battle of 20,000,000 freemen, with what *appears* to be the enormous power of England, would be effective in eliciting an enthusiasm for liberty and the rights of the human race throughout Europe, far exceeding that which the sparks of the glorious revolution of '76 produced; that the United States are in natural progress towards wealth, power and high estate; that no artificial means are necessary to maintain that position, and consequent influence among the nations of the earth. That our power, like the young giant's, is sufficiently developed to show what it will be in manhood, when training and skill regulate its exhibition. That still it is like the young giant's with broken limbs, to those who madly seek to grapple with it. The wise capitalist seeing all these things, would neither invest his money in the exchequer of the brittle monarchies of Europe, nor lock it up in chests in countries which are subject to convulsion and revolution. But the iron-clamped republic would attract his regards, within whose capacious bosom the oppressed and wearied men of Europe seek for comfort and repose; and into whose coffers the wealth of the world is destined to flow.

Thus it is seen that men, materials and money exist in abundance for the vigorous prosecution of a war with the most powerful nation of the world, or if you please with the nations combined. The more the better, for the sooner would king.craft and priest-craft cease to exist.

Let us extend these memoranda a little further in order to show the doings of a wise and energetic government on the approach and during the existence of a war.

1st. It raises an army of 45,000 men, and calls 15,000 of the sedentary force into service for exercise and drill in the fortifications lying within the respective districts of these troops. It establishes convenient depots and magazines on the lower frontier of Canada, making the grand depot at Rouse's point at the outlet of Lake Champlain. It makes contracts with the master shipwrights of Charleston, Norfolk, Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, New London, Newport, Boston, Portsmouth, Portland,

&c. &c. for the construction of 20 ships of the line, 40 large frigates, and 30 steamers, and at St. Louis, Louisville, Cincinnati, &c., for 30 or 40 steamers, to be in readiness in six months.

It concentrates at Rouse's Point 35,000 men, threatening Montreal and the lower St. Lawrence, and compelling the English to maintain their whole possible force on the plains of Montreal. It calls upon the armed men of the frontier, from Wisconsin to New Hampshire to hold themselves in readiness and receive the proper transportation on the Lakes.—Active and intelligent officers are appointed to commond these men; to regulate and restrain them when precipitated on the fields of Canada; to instruct these men to treat the Canadians as bretheren, and to proclaim that the war is not waged against them, their wives and children, but only against the common enemy in the shape of European domination.

Thus every thing is done systematically and in good order, whilst zeal, promptness and vigorous exertion marks each movement.

These armed men move forward; they sweep through the lakes and valleys and communicate with the army in advance at Rouse's Point. The whole mass moves upon Montreal. It is like an avalanche. The English army retreats and finds safety only under the walls of Quebec. The investment is made; the siege is begun; then comes the "eminently deadly breach," and the garrison's surrender. The stars and stripes float victoriously over the last strong hold of British power on the continent of America.

In the mean time the great naval operations are proceeding. Ships and steamers are rapidly built. Squadrons of heavy frigates, in all at least 50 frigates, are sent forth to range along the coast of India, China, and the British colonies all over the world. How many British vessels would be sent after these noble frigates of ours, which, being divided into 10 or 12 squadrons, attack as many places at the same time. Why the English with any reasonable hope of protecting their colonies and commerce, would be obliged to send out at least 100 ships. Now 100 heavy frigates form a very respectable detachment from that terrible English fleet that Harry Bluff in all sincerity says, shall succeed in sailing slyly and surely some seventeen hundred miles from the sea to Superior.

When 20 ships of the line are built and the eleven already built are repaired, collect them at Norfolk, the salient of the Atlantic coast, and just whisper into Editorial ears, for the information of England, *that the coast of England is the destination of the fleet at Norfolk.*

When the heavy steamers are built let them dash at blockades, and uniting with the fleet at Norfolk, as occasion requires, exhibit a force equal to any that England could bring against it. It does not come within our strategy that this fleet should even hoist anchor. Its object is to compel England to maintain a superior force at Portsmouth and along her coast; she would be obliged to do this, and thus 30 ships of the line are placed *hors d'activité* and 20 more are kept cruizing on the coast and the English channel, watching the hasty movements of France, whilst numerous steamers are required to guard the open harbors of Liverpool, Hull, Bristol, London, Cork and Dublin.

And here is another considerable detachment from that formidable fleet which certain sleek citizens with fat bodies and faint hearts do so much groan about. But when they read these memoranda, I trust they will cheer up and go dine on fat capon.

In time of profound peace, jealous naval powers of Europe, keep large forces in the Mediterranean to watch each others movements. During the Syrian demonstration, England alone maintained 20 ships of the line, besides, frigates, steamers, etc., in that sea. How many would she be obliged to keep in a hot contest with America, when France looking out from her strong holds in the Mediterranean is ready to make another descent on Egypt; and with Russia waiting her time to seize the prize she so much covets at the Bosphorus? Well, it would not be extravagant to say, that at least 20 ships of the line would be maintained by England in the Mediterranean, exhibiting no small detachment from *that fleet* which is to burn down our cities, batter our forts, and sail up our rivers with impunity.

We have yet to notice the movement of 30 war steamers issuing from the Mississippi and taking position at Tortugas and Key West, where depots should be amply supplied with coals, provisions and the munitions of war. These steamers of 2500 tons burden threaten Jamaica and the windward islands, Nassau, etc. A portion of the English fleet (if there be any to spare) must guard the colonies and Bermuda and Halifax. That is the object of the demonstration of the Gulf forces. It is gained. Then those forces pass rapidly up the south and north Atlantic coast, sweeping them from Florida to Maine and forming junctions with the Atlantic forces, *especially with the Norfolk fleet, which is always on the eve of sailing to the coast of England.*

In the mean time the ocean is covered with private armed ships. Those 50 or 60 noble "Liners," now employed as packets to London, Liverpool, Havre, Charleston, New Orleans, etc., are converted into armed corvettes which, with hundreds of smaller vessels, sweep over the ocean to the destruction of British commerce.

And what would be the result of all this? Why, our harbors are free from blockade; our frontiers repose in peace: our industrial population hear of war only from afar: our manufactures thrive, *and a neutral commerce is maintained pouring large revenues into the Treasury and affording a sum equal to one half the expenses of the war.*

And what would be the cost of all this? The cost no nation should count simply on the score of dollars and cents, when honor and the integrity of the country were at stake. But even here great satisfaction is afforded: Reliable estimates have been made showing that, if a war were conducted on the stragetic principles shadowed forth in these memoranda, its military operations would not cost over $25,000,000 per annum for the first year, and in the second not more than 15,000,000. That the navy being composed of 31 ships of the line, 50 frigates, 30 corvettes and 60 steamers, *all in activity*, would cost about 40,000,000 per annum. So that, the aggregate cost of the military operation is exhibited at 65,000,000 for the first year, and thereafter at the annual expense of 40,000,000.

To the expenditures of the first year must be added 50,000,000 (a large estimate) for new ships, ordinance, etc., after which the cost of repair, and wear and tear of ship is included in the annual estimates above stated.

These are large figures surely, but England would be obliged to deal in larger, say 3 to 1. The Duke of Wellington has said, and it has been repeated, if I mistake not, by the (English) Albion, newspaper in New York, that "England cannot wage a little war"—well, *then the United States must wage no little war*, and I thank God from the depths of my American heart that the United States *can* wage a big war, aye big enough to satisfy the "Iron Duke" or fifty like him. We have the means already piled as high as the steeple tops: we have the men: and we can command the money. Then what do we want save a just cause to enable us to grapple heartily with England either in a big or little war, just as it may suit that old Iron Duke, who, at Waterloo, exclaimed in his agony, would that Blucher or night had come!"

What would be the glory of all this?

To have exercised forbearance until it ceased to be a virtne. To have sought ardently to preserve peace. To have made sacrifices of many things, save honor, rather than resort to the exhibition of brute force as the last resort. To have preferred years of negotiation, to one bloody day, to two people speaking the same language and a common ancestry. To have done all this without effect to preserve peace, and to be compelled to hold forth the power of the iron-clamped Republic for the brittle monarchy of England to dash its possible strength against until it is broken to pieces, would be glory enough! C.

Pensacola, Nov. 1845.

The foregoing memoir and memoranda were written to show that the country is already in a much better condition for defence by actual preparation than many persons believe it is; and also to exhibit the vast means that may be brought quickly into activity by which a successful and triumphant war may be prosecuted against England or any other power.—But this array of men, money and materials is not exhibited because it is thought that a war will take place; but only to assure some of our editors and other citizens that should a possible rupture occur with England the results would be more injurious to that power than the United States. And it is hoped that those nervous gentlemen will be a little more composed after reading the foregoing memoranda. If they still have their doubts perhaps the following additional memoranda may encourage them somewhat:

Mems.—There will be no war with England. The United States desire no war, and will be careful, whilst upholding their rights, to afford no just cause for war. England desires no war; she would hesitate to declare war, even if her rights were invaded by the United States. A British ministry declaring war against the United States could not remain in power forty-eight hours. The powerful bankers, the princly merchants, and the *Cotton Lords*, backed by the middling classes, whose daily gains depend on the prevalence of peace, exhibit a combination of power too strong for the English oligarchy to resist. The House of Commons commanding peace, the Peers could do nothing but obey. One week's supply of Cotton wanting in the factories of England places the country on the eve of a revolution. The salvation of England depends upon uninterrupted relations in commerce with the United States. The maintenance of

these relations is of great importance to the United States, but it is not vitally so. The United States could stand the shock of a rupture; but England would crumble under it. The United States as the great Cotton grower of the world possesses a vast power. It is understood and felt by every civilized nation. With this power they control the commercial world; and by this power they can command peace, at least for themselves. The comparison of the strength of the United States with other nations must be made on this score and not upon that of the brute force power. The mistake, in estimating the respective powers of the United States and England, consists in counting the number of red plumes stuck in the caps of a well trained soldiery on one side, and the number of blue plumes stuck in the caps of hastily mustered forces on the other side.—Now in the United States we may raze our forts to the ground, sink our war vessels, and send the whole army to military colonies in Texas without compromising the safety, honor or integrity of the country. By the annexation of Texas the United States have secured the monopoly of growing the great staple of the world—of that raw material the manufacture of which has become absolutely necessary to the existence of England, and which is rapidly bringing all Europe to its subjection. The interruption of its supply from the United States cannot be remedied from any other quarter of the globe, and its effects upon the world would be most disastrous. So that men may make up their minds, there will be no war, especially if the United States adhere to the maxim, "to ask nothing that is not right, or submit to nothing that is wrong." The true policy of England then, is to preserve the friendship of the United States. It is an easy task. Let England content herself with her present acknowledged and undisputed possessions in North America. Let her sell to the United States her claims to a portion of Oregon; and let her forbear in future the attempt to colonize any portion of the North American continent. In a word, let her cease to oppose the policy of the United States in their American relations, in the same manner that the United States abstain from interference with the policy of Europe as it relates to Europe. If England, under wise counsels will adopt this line of conduct, all causes of war are removed now and forever. Then would England and the United States be bound together by the strongest ties. Their people derived from a common lineage, speaking the same noble language, and possessing the same indomitable energies, would be competitors only in the peaceful pursuits of commerce, carrying the light of civilization and liberty to every corner of the earth. Such a consummation is devoutly to be wished for, and so may it be! C.

Pensacola, December 6th, 1845.